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Abstract: Investors have been trying to formulate the optimum composition of executives’ com-
pensation which will incentivize the executives to perform better and act in the shareholders’ best
interests. This study aims to find empirical evidence about the impact of executive compensation
on the default risk with the Credit Default Swap (CDS) spread as the proxy, using panel data to
test the research model, which combines the analysis of cross-section and time series data. The
study is conducted based on 1,416 observations of 177 U.S. companies from 2008-2015. The data
are mainly collected from Datastream, Compustat, CRSP, and the US SEC’s EDGAR database.
The current study provides a contribution by suggesting that executives’ compensation will trigger
risk-taking behavior. The results of this study reveal, firstly, both equity-based compensation and
debt-like compensation induce risk-taking behavior by the executives. Secondly, the correlation
between both the form of the compensation and the CDS spread is weakened in a high informa-
tion asymmetry environment. Lastly, this study finds that a CFO’s compensation has more influ-
ence on the CDS spread, compared to the other board executives, but this condition only occurs
when the compensation is awarded in the form of debt-like compensation. To improve the gener-
alization of the results, a further study may consider expanding the sample into several countries.
Keywords: CDS spread; executive compensation; information asymmetry; risk-taking;
CFO




Research into executives’ compensa-
tion mostly predicts the relationship of pay
for performance, based on the agency
theory introduced by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). The principal delegates some au-
thority to the agent, in order to drive the
agent to act on behalf of the principal. In-
stead of focusing on the shareholders’ in-
terests, the agency theory alleges that man-
agers first and foremost act in their own
interests. The risk preferences of the agent
will be based on the action that will give
them the greater benefit. Moreover, due to
information asymmetry, the principal can-
not be sure that the agent will always act in
the principal’s best interest. The informa-
tion asymmetry occurs when a certain
group holds information and they do not
transmit it to another group. The manager
who controls the daily business of the firm
has more knowledge and information about
the firm, compared to the shareholders. To
increase the monitoring, the shareholders
will have to pay more. Thus, executives’
compensation should be designed to miti-
gate the agency problem (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Holmstrom (1979)
pointed out that the compensation of a
firm’s management should be linked to the
firm’s performance; hence, the manager will
create value for the shareholders.
Executives’ compensation can be
awarded in the form of cash, stock, options,
pension, and etcetera. Several studies have
been conducted to see whether those forms
of compensation induce risk-taking. The
results of those studies show that balanc-
ing compensation and risk-taking remains
a challenge. Finance literature mostly fo-
cuses on investigating the effect of execu-
tive compensation on firm risk. This study
aims to add to the literature on the effect
of executive compensation on the default
risk, along with a recent paper by Bolton,
Mehran, and Shapiro (2015). The Credit
Default Swap (CDS) spread provides a
market estimate of the default risk of the
company.
Improving on several prior studies,
this study makes a comparison between
two forms of compensation: equity-based
compensation and debt-like compensation.
Devers et al. (2008), Coles, Daniel, and
Naveen (2006) and Chen, Steiner, and
Whyte (2006) show that equity-based com-
pensation triggers managerial risk-taking.
On the other hand, Bolton et al. (2015)
focus on CEOs’ compensation in the form
of deferred compensation and pension ben-
efits because of their debt-like characteris-
tics. They suggest tying executives’ com-
pensation to the CDS spread, in order to
align the executives’ objectives with the
shareholders’ objectives, in term of risk
choices. They find that the percentage of
CEOs’ incentives, in the form of deferred
compensation and pensions, have a nega-
tive relationship with the CDS spread (the
measure of risk). Their finding is in line
with the study by Wei and Yermack (2011)
which also found that the revelation of
more CEOs’ inside debt compensation
lowers the CDS spread for these firms. Wei
and Yermack (2011) and Edmans and Liu
(2010) argue that both deferred pay and
pensions are unsecured in the event of a
default. As a result, executives with large
holdings in deferred pay and pensions are
unlikely to undertake risky investment
choices. Nevertheless, contrary to previous
studies, this research finds that debt-like
compensation also has a positive relation-
ship with the CDS spread, like equity-based
compensation. A company with a lower
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leverage ratio has room for the executives
to take more risks, since the default risk is
lower.
This paper also takes into consider-
ation that there might be a condition that
may affect the relationship between execu-
tive compensation and the CDS spread.
Since executive compensation is designed
in response to the agency problem, a fac-
tor that will affect the agency problem will
also affect the alignment of the executives’
and shareholders’ interests. According to
Myers and Majlut (1984), information
asymmetry will increase the agency prob-
lem and managers will have more chance
to act in their own interests. Vallascas and
Keasey (2013) and Wintoki et al. (2012) find
that the default risk of a bank is increased
due to information asymmetry. The infor-
mation asymmetry allows the management
of the firm to act based on the benefits they
will get. As a result of information asym-
metry, the investors will punish the firm
by increasing the cost of acquiring more
funds (Bharath et al. 2008). Since the pric-
ing of the CDS is based on the quality of
the debt, the increase in the cost of debt
will also increase the CDS spread. The
above evidence leads us to extend our
theory of compensation to propose that
information asymmetry moderates the ef-
fect of executive compensation on the
CDS spread. However, our findings show
that instead of strengthening the relation-
ship of compensation and the CDS spread,
information asymmetry will weaken the
relationship, regardless of the form of the
compensation.
This paper extends the prior research
by looking into the role of executive man-
agement to see which executive manager
has more influence over the risk-taking
decisions of the company. The executive
management could consist of the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer
(COO), and others. This study finds that a
CFO’s compensation has slightly more in-
fluence on the CDS spread, compared to
the other board executives, when the com-
pensation is awarded in a debt-like compen-
sation form. This result is consistent with
the findings of Jiang et al. (2010) which state
that a CFO has more influence over the
financial decision making of the firm com-
pared to the CEO, since it is his/her main
responsibility in the firm’s financial state-
ment. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) also
state that a CFO has more influence when
it comes to a debt-related decision.
To sum up, this paper wants to in-
vestigate and answer the following main
research question:
What is the effect of executive compensation
on the CDS spread of a company?
To support the main research question, this
paper also examines some sub-questions to
gain a greater understanding about the re-
lationship of executive compensation and
the CDS spread. The sub-research questions
are:
i. What is the best form of compensation
to induce less risk-taking?
ii. To what extent does the relationship of
executive compensation and the CDS
spread’s changes have regarding the level
of information asymmetry in the indus-
try?
iii. Does a CFO have more influence over
the management’s risk-taking compared
to other members of the executive man-
agement?
This research uses panel data to test
the research model, which combines the
analysis of the cross-section and time se-
Meizaroh and Masripah
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ries data. The panel data approach used in
this paper is the Fixed Effect Model (FEM)
for all the models testing the hypotheses.
The study is conducted based on 1,416
observations of 177 U.S. companies from
2008-2015. The data are mainly collected
from Datastream, Compustat, the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and
the US SEC’s EDGAR database.
The results of this study can be ben-
eficial for the shareholders and executives
when viewing risk-taking incentives. It can
help the shareholders to understand the
conditions that will motivate the executives
to take more risks and help them in setting
a control to manage the risk taken by the
executives. On the other hand, it helps the
executives to be more aware of the effects
of their risk-taking behavior.
The remainder of this paper is struc-
tured as follows. In the next section, a lit-
erature review regarding the recent studies
and development of the CDS spread, ex-
ecutive compensation, and information
asymmetry is provided and the hypotheses
development is built. In the third section,
the methodology of this paper is described.
The fourth section explains the results of
the analysis. Finally, the last section pro-
vides a summary of the current findings and
is also complemented by the current




This paper uses the CDS spread as the
proxy of the default risk, since it is widely
considered to be an excellent indicator of
the markets’ perception of a firm’s default
risk (Bolton et. al. 2015). CDS is an insur-
ance contract to transfer the credit expo-
sure between two or more parties. The
premium paid by the CDS holder is in line
with the riskiness of the firm’s credit; the
higher the risk, the higher the premium
(Hull et al. 2004). The amount that should
be paid by the CDS buyer is known as the
CDS spread. If the bond issuer fails to pay
its debt, the seller of the CDS has to buy
back the defaulted bond from the buyer at
its par value (Longstaff et al. 2005). CDS
does not require the protection’s buyer to
hold the bonds of the reference entity.
Thus, an investor can use CDS to specu-
late on the default or credit downgrades of
the bonds (White 2014). The premium of
the CDS spread depends on the credit qual-
ity of the issuer and on the maturity of the
bond. It also prices the credit risk of the
underlying firm by using the quality rat-
ings of a number of financial ratios (Bodie
et al. 2011). These ratings reflect the over-
all credit risk of the firm and the risk of
them defaulting on their obligation. A
higher risk of default will result in a lower
credit rating for the firm. The bondholder
will ask for a higher yield to compensate
the higher risk of default that they bear. It




Even though the bond issuers do not
play a direct role in a CDS contract, as the
issuer of the underlying securities, they af-
fect the CDS spread. Any actions by the
bond issuer that will increase the probabil-
ity of a default of the bonds will also in-
crease the premium paid by the CDS buyer.
The executive management of the com-
pany, which is the bond issuer, has a role
in driving the risk taken by the firm.
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Through his research in 1979, Holmstrom
shows that the firm should tie up the man-
agers’ compensation with the firm’s perfor-
mance. Therefore, it can solve the agency
problem and push the managers to act in
the shareholders’ interest. However, ac-
cording to Bolton et al. (2015), structuring
the executive compensation to maximize
shareholder value will encourage them to
take excessive risks. This section explains
the relationship between executive com-
pensation and the CDS spread, which is
used to formulate the hypotheses.
Pay-performance Relationship
The idea underlining pay for perfor-
mance is based on the agency theory
(Amzaleg et. al. 2014). Based on this theory,
compensation plans are designed to balance
the self-interest of the executives with their
shareholders’ interests. Directly monitor-
ing the executives’ behavior is difficult.
Many scholars suggest aligning the risk pref-
erences of the executives and shareholders
by granting the executives equity-based
compensation, which is assumed to dis-
courage risk aversion (Devers et al. 2008).
This equity-based compensation is the sum
of any option-based compensation and the
restricted shares owned by the executives.
By tying up the executives’ compensation
with the firm’s performance, the executives
will have to work harder to obtain their
share of the gains of the company. Other
studies by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
(2006) and Chen, Steiner, and Whyte
(2006) show that aligning the executives’
compensation to performance has another
impact. They use equity-based compensa-
tion as the proxy for executive compensa-
tion. Since their wealth is sensitive to the
firm’s stock return, the executives will be
more eager to take a risk which will increase
the firm’s risk. Increasing firm risk could
increase the probability of default, so this
paper hypothesizes that the CDS spread
will also increase. The hypothesis is as fol-
lows:
Hypothesis 1a: Equity-based compensation
has a positive impact on the
CDS spread of a firm.
A recent study by Bolton et. al. (2015)
focuses on deferred compensation and pen-
sion benefits, instead of equity-based com-
pensation, to reduce risky behavior. Both
deferred compensation and pension ben-
efits have a debt characteristic, since they
are unsecured future claims. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) speculate that to attenu-
ate the stockholder-bondholder conflicts,
the executives should be granted equal pro-
portions of debt-like compensation and
equity-based compensation. Thus, the ex-
ecutives will not be purely equity-aligned
(Edmans and Liu 2010). Other studies by
Wei and Yermack (2011) and Edmans and
Liu (2010) also find that debt-like compen-
sation reduces risk-taking. After the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-2008, the greater use of
deferred compensation for executive man-
agement has been advocated by a lot of
parties (Wei and Yermack 2011). The rec-
ommendation arose due to the belief that
equity-based compensation caused exces-
sive risk-taking. In the large majority of
firms, the debt-like compensation exposes
the executives to the same default risks that
are borne by outside creditors. Thus, by
awarding the executives a debt-like compen-
sation, they will be more careful in their
actions, so as not to increase the default risk
of the firm. Aligned with these studies, this
paper develops a hypothesis, as follows:
Hypothesis 1b: Debt-like compensation has a
negative impact on the CDS




Research by Acharya and Johnson
(2007) and Chiappori (2000) show that in-
formation asymmetry causes the insurance
premium to increase in equilibrium.
Acharya and Johnson (2007) studied the
insurance of credit default (the proxy is
CDS) while Chiappori (2000) studied the
information asymmetry in car insurance.
The driver in this conclusion is the pres-
ence of “common values” which is the link
between the agents’ hidden information
and the other party’s payoff (Chiappori
2000). For example, in the market for “lem-
ons”, the buyer’s payoff depends on the
quality of the car, which is only known by
the seller. Similarly, the CDS buyer should
pay an amount which is dependent on the
quality of the underlying asset, which is
mostly known and driven by the insider
of the firm. Bharath et al. (2008) argue that
asymmetric information is an important
determinant of capital structure decisions.
They argue that if managers have more in-
formation about the firm’s value than the
rest of the market, they will be penalized
by the market. The cost of acquiring more
funds will increase since it is incorporated
with the risk of asymmetric information
held by the investor. The increase in the
cost of debt will cause an increase in the
CDS spread as well, since the pricing of the
CDS is also based on the quality of the debt
as the underlying assets.
Based on the above arguments, this
paper predicts that information asymme-
try will strengthen the relationships of eq-
uity-based compensation, as discussed in
Hypothesis 1a. When the executives are
granted an equity-based compensation,
they will be induced to take more risks. This
paper hypothesizes that debt-like compen-
sation has a negative impact on the CDS
spread, while the information asymmetry
could increase the default risk of the firm.
Thus, the information asymmetry will neu-
tralize the relationship between debt-like
compensation and the CDS spread. How-
ever, when they are granted a debt-like com-
pensation, they will be more reluctant to
take the risk. The hypotheses are as below:
Hypothesis 2a: Information asymmetry
strengthens the relationship of
equity-based compensation
and the CDS spread.
Hypothesis 2b: Information asymmetry weak-
ens the relationship of debt-
like compensation and the
CDS spread.
Chief Financial Officer vs Other
Board Executives
The executive management consists of
several people. One member could have
greater authority than the other members.
A study by Duong and Evans (2015) re-
veals that compensation is not linked to
performance at the CFO-specific level. In
contrast to the incentive alignment ap-
proach, the CFOs receive more non-cash
compensation even though the quality of
reporting is lower. On the other hand,
Jiang et al. (2010) investigated the influence
of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) on earnings
management. They find that the CFO has
a greater role in earnings management, and
the firm’s likelihood of beating any fore-
casts by analysts is also more sensitive to
the CFO’s incentives, compared to those
of a CEO. The reason is that the CFOs’
main responsibility is the firms’ financial
reporting. According to Chava and
Purnanandam (2010), the incentives of a
firm’s key management are related to cor-
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porate risk-taking. The risk preference of
the CEO affects the leverage and cash-hold-
ing policies. However, when it comes to
debt maturity’s structure and accrual deci-
sions, the CFO’s risk preferences have
more impact on the decisions taken. This
evidence supports the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s (SEC) disclosure re-
quirement on CFOs’ compensation.
In 2006, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) amended its disclosure
regulations on executive compensation by
requiring firms to disclose their CFOs’ com-
pensation. The SEC stated that ‘‘compen-
sation of the principal financial officer is
important to shareholders because along
with the principal executive officer, the
principal financial officer provides the cer-
tifications required with the company’s
periodic reports and has important re-
sponsibility for the fair presentation of the
company’s financial statements and finan-
cial information’’ (Securities and Exchange
Commission 2006: 117). Thus, when ana-
lyzing the effect of executives’ compensa-
tion on the CDS spread; this paper assumes
that the CFO will have a greater impact
than the other executives on the board.
Hypothesis 3a: The CFO’s equity-based com-
pensation has a stronger effect
on the CDS spread than the
other board executives’ equity-
based compensation.
Hypothesis 3b: The CFO’s debt-like compen-
sation has a stronger effect on





The population of the data in this re-
search is U.S. based companies, which has
the most comprehensive database available.
The final dataset consists of the CDS
spread, equity-based compensation, debt-
like compensation, and stock data. The
period starts from 2008 until 2015 since the
CDS spreads’ data are available on
Thomson Reuters Datastream from De-
cember 2007. However, the compensa-
tions’ data starts from 2007, since lagged
variables are used. The sample selection
requires the companies to have data avail-
able on Datastream, Compustat, the Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
and the U.S. SEC’s EDGAR database to
construct the variables. As a result, there
are 117 companies that met the require-
ments. Besides the variable mentioned in
the hypotheses, this research also uses
ownership concentration and firm charac-
teristics as control variables.
Variables
CDS Spread
The CDS spread data is retrieved
from Datastream which has a daily inter-
val. The spread is expressed in basis points
of the notional amount of the contract
(Pires et al. 2015). The CDS spread data are
available for ten different maturities vary-
ing from one to ten years. This research
uses the average daily spread over the whole
year of a five-year maturity contract. The
Meizaroh and Masripah
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CDS of a five-year maturity contract is the
type of CDS that is usually embedded in a
firms’ most widely traded contract (Bolton
et. al. 2015). According to Blanco et al.
(2005), it is also the most liquid spread
amongst the available CDS spreads. Senior
CDS spreads are used since they offer bet-
ter data coverage than subordinated
(Chiaramonte and Casu 2013).
Equity-Based Compensation
This paper uses the average equity-
based compensation of multiple executives.
The equity-based compensation consists of
the option and restricted shares awarded to
the executives. The restricted shares’ value
is retrieved from Compustat. The options
are valued by using the option pricing model
from Black, Scholes and Merton, as de-
scribed in Core and Guay (2002). This
model is widely used because of its risk-
neutral feature which is achieved through
its dynamic hedging paradigm (Corrado
2009).
The amounts of granted options and
previously granted options are retrieved
from Compustat. The inputs used to cal-
culate the options’ value are stock price,
volatility, dividend yield, risk-free rate, ex-
ercise price, and time-to-maturity. The
stock price is available on CRSP. The stock
price which is used to value the restricted
stock and options is the share price on 31
December each year. The expected stock
return volatility and expected dividend
yield are estimated using Compustat and
CRSP data. The dividend yield is calculated
by dividing the dividend per share granted
in that year with share price as of 31 De-
cember. The volatility is the variance of the
daily stock returns over the whole year.
The risk-free rate is based on the US Gov-
ernment Treasury Yield correspond to the
option’s time-to-maturity. The exercise
price and time-to-maturity are retrieved
from the company’s proxy statement DEF-
14A which is available on EDGAR. To
mitigate the possibility of simultaneity con-
cerns, the equity-based compensation is
matched to the CDS spread data of a year
later.
Debt-Like Compensation
The debt-like compensation consists
of deferred compensation and pension ben-
efits. This paper uses the average value of
the debt-like compensation for all execu-
tives, which is available on Compustat
Execucomp.
Information Asymmetry
The share price explains a significant
part of the information asymmetry
(Boujelbene and Besbes 2012; Attig et al.
2006). It represents the unobservable mini-
mum cost borne by the investors
(Boujelbene and Besbes 2012). The share
price is a proxy for the unobservable mini-
mum cost of detention of the market mak-
ers, and it influences the variability of the
shareholders’ return. Thus, this research
uses a dummy variable as the proxy of in-
formation asymmetry: one (1) if the differ-
ence between the highest bid and the low-
est ask price during the year is higher than
the average spread within the industry, oth-
erwise, the dummy variable is zero (0). The
bid and ask price are retrieved from
Compustat.
Ownership Concentration
The ownership concentration is in-
cluded in this research as a control variable.
Paligorova (2010) argues that ownership
structure affects the ability of sharehold-
ers to influence the corporate risk-taking.
When the ownership is concentrated with
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just a few shareholders, those sharehold-
ers will have more incentives to gather in-
formation and monitor the firm to maxi-
mize their profit. Laeven and Levine (2009)
find that majority shareholders tend to ac-
cept a higher level of risk. Hammami and
Boubaker (2015) also confirm this finding
by studying the ownership structure of
banks and the relation to risk-taking. They
find that the risk-taking behavior will dif-
fer depending on the degree of ownership
concentration. The proxy of ownership
concentration is the ownership percentage
of the largest shareholders. The sharehold-
ers’ data is retrieved from the company’s
proxy statement available on EDGAR.
Firm Characteristics
The firm characteristics which are
used as control variables in this paper are
Return on Assets (ROA), leverage ratio,
cash holding ratio, firm risk, and Tobin’s
Q ratio. These firm characteristics are
widely used as control variables since em-
pirical research has found that they deter-
mine the tendency of a firm to take risks
and are similar to those previous studies of
Coles et al. (2006) and Aunon-Nerin et al.
(2002). The data to construct ROA, lever-
age ratio, cash holding ratio, firm risk, and
Tobin’s Q ratio are retrieved from
Compustat and calculated as shown in
Table 1.
Research Model
This research uses three equation
models to answer the research questions
which are captured in the hypotheses 1, 2,
and 3. The regression in this study is per-
formed using Stata. The equation models


























































































where CDS is the average of the daily credit
default swap spread, EBC is the average
Firm Characteristics Measurement 
ROA Net income divided by lagged total assets 
Leverage ratio Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Cash holding ratio Cash holdings divided by total assets 
Firm risk The logarithm of the daily stock price’s variance per month 
Tobin's Q ratio Total market value of the firm divided by total assets 
 
Table 1. Firm Characteristics
Meizaroh and Masripah
28
equity-based compensation for all the ex-
ecutive management, DLC is the average
debt-like compensation of all the executive
management, IA is the dummy variable for
information asymmetry, IA*EBC is the
interaction between information asymme-
try and equity-based compensation,
IA*DLC is the interaction between infor-
mation asymmetry and debt-like compen-
sation, CFO EBC is the CFO’s equity-
based compensation, CFO DLC is the
CFO’s debt-like compensation, OBE EBC
is the average of the other board executives’
equity-based compensation, OBE DLC is
the average of the other board executives’
debt-like compensation and the control
variables of ownership concentration,
ROA, leverage ratio, cash holding ratio,
firm risk, and Tobin’s Q ratio.
Data Analysis and Discussion
Descriptive
Table 2 provides the distribution of
variables used in all the regression models.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Description:
CDS = CDS Spread; EBC = Equity-based Compensation; DLC = Debt-like Compensation; IA = Information
Asymmetry; LEV = Leverage; OWN = Ownership Structure; CHR = Cash Holding Ratio; FR = Firm Risk;
ROA = Return of Asset; TQ = Tobin’s Q; CFO EBC = CFO’s Equity-based Compensation; CFO DLC =
CFO’s Debt-like Compensation; OBE EBC = Other Board Executives’ Equity-based Compensation; OBE
DLC = Other Board Executives’ Debt-like Compensation. The CDS is expressed as a basis point. The data
used in this research are nominated in US dollars. The EBC, DLC, CFO EBC, CFO DLC, OBE EBC, OBE
DLC are stated in thousands of US dollars.
Variable N Mean Min. Median Max. Skew 
CDS 1,416 223.95 12.84 130.48 1,878.17 3.38 
EBC 1,416 13,727 19.51 7,448 415,959 -0.43 
DLC 1,416 5,185 0.00 2,907 54,206 -1.80 
IA 1,416 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 
CFO EBC 1,416 7,780 0.00 4,224 171,982 -1.92 
CFO DLC 1,416 2,904 0.00 1,149 45,631 -1.05 
OBE EBC 1,416 15,152 0.00 8,083 476,954 -0.79 
OBE DLC 1,416 5,805 0.00 3,174 62,812 -1.79 
LEV 1,416 0.28 0.00 0.25 1.51 1.56 
OWN 1,416 11.78 3.90 9.40 51.14 3.30 
CHR 1,416 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.55 2.11 
FR 1,416 0.40 0.10 0.31 2.65 2.33 
ROA 1,416 0.71 -0.06 0.59 3.77 1.70 
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The minimum and mean values of the CDS
spread are much lower than its maximum
value. Thus, the data is widely spread with
a skewness value of 3.38 and the skewed
distribution of this variable tends to the left-
hand direction.
To begin with the executive compen-
sation data, the executive management re-
ceived more compensation in the form of
equity-based compensation than debt-like
compensation. On average, the executives
received USD 13,727 thousand equity-
based compensation and US 5,185 thou-
sand debt-like compensation. The CFO
received less compensation, compared to
the other board executives, for both forms
of compensation.
The information asymmetry is repre-
sented with a dummy variable with the
value of one (1) for a high information
asymmetry firm and the value of zero (0)
for less information asymmetry. On aver-
age, 46 percent of the sample’s firms have
a high information asymmetry and 54 per-
cent of the observations are firms with a
low information asymmetry.
The distribution of ownership con-
centration in the sample is widely spread.
The sample consists of firms which are
highly concentrated, with one firm’s larg-
est shareholder owning 51.14 percent of the
firm’s shares, while another firm’s largest
shareholder owns only 3.9 percent of the
firm’s shares. The sample selection excludes
the firms which do not disclose their larg-
est shareholder.
Continuing to the variables of firm
characteristics, the variable ROA has a
negative minimum value. This is because
bad performers are not excluded from the
sample. The leverage ratio and cash hold-
ing ratio have a minimum value of zero (0),
this is because the company has remaining
leverage and cash worth less than one mil-
lion, and the data available on Compustat
is in millions of USD.
Compensation on CDS Spread
The regression results for Model 1
show that the equation model has a value
for the F-statistic of 147.93, with a prob-
ability (F-statistic) of 0.000. These results
show that Model 1 has a significant prob-
ability at the 1 percent level. It explains that
all of the independent variables tested in
Model 1 significantly affect the CDS spread,
as the dependent variable, simultaneously,
but the effects are very weak. Executive
compensation is the main explanatory vari-
able in this study. Both equity-based com-
pensation and debt-like compensation sig-
nificantly affect the CDS spread. The eq-
uity-based compensation has a coefficient
of 0.0000305 and a p-value of 0.001. This
means that the equity-based compensation
variable has a positive effect on the CDS
spread at the 1 percent significance level,
although the small coefficient indicates that
the CDS spread has other bigger determi-
nant factors. The result of this test aligns
with the previous studies by Devers et al.
(2008), Coles et al. (2006), and Chen et al.
(2006) which concluded that by awarding
equity-based compensation to the execu-
tive management, they will be more will-
ing to take a risk, which can cause the de-
fault risk of the firm, which is measured
by the CDS spread, to increase.
The variable debt-like compensation
has a coefficient of 0.0016294 and a p-value
of 0.000. This suggests that the debt-based
compensation has a significant positive ef-
fect on the CDS spread. Instead of neutral-
izing the willingness of the executive to take
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risks, debt-like compensation triggers the
executives to take risks. Bolton et. al. (2015)
and Wei and Yermack (2011) find that debt-
like compensation is associated with lower
risk-taking. The sample period of their stud-
ies was before the financial crisis of 2008.
Tung and Wang (2011) and Bekkum (2014)
compare the impact of debt-like compen-
sation and risk-taking before and after the
crisis. Before the crisis, their studies reveal
that the debt-like compensation lowers risk-
taking. However, after the crisis, the result
is the opposite. This different impact is
caused by the lower leverage ratio after the
financial crisis. It gives room for the execu-
tives to take more risks since the default
risk is lower. Both equity-based compen-
sation and debt-like compensation signifi-
cantly affect the CDS spread. The coeffi-
cient of debt-like compensation is bigger
than the coefficient of equity-based com-
pensation which means the debt-like com-
pensation has a higher impact on the CDS
spread. This should form part of the share-






Coeff Prob   
C   0.0045589 0.000   
EBC + 0.0000305 0.000 *** 
DLC - 0.0016294 0.000 *** 
IA + -0.0066792 0.000 *** 
LEV + 0.0151804 0.000 *** 
OWN + 0.000249 0.000 *** 
CHR - -0.0067949 0.121  
FR + 0.0397769 0.000 *** 
ROA - -0.0001255 0.012 ** 
TQ - -0.0011197 0.227  
Adj. R-squared 0.3038 
F-statistic 147.93 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
Table 3. Regression Result of Model 1
*** significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level
Description:
EBC= Equity-based Compensation; DLC= Debt-like Compensation; IA= Information Asymmetry; LEV=
Leverage; OWN= Ownership Structure; CHR= Cash Holding Ratio; FR= Firm Risk; ROA= Return of
Asset; TQ= Tobin’s Q.
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Information Asymmetry,
Compensation, and CDS Spread
The regression results for Model 2
show that the model equation’s F-statistic
has a value of 11,674.58 with a probability
(F-statistic) of 0.000. The results indicate
that Model 2 in this study has a significant
probability at the 1 percent level. It explains
that all of the independent variables in
Model 2 significantly affect the CDS spread,
as the dependent variable. The value of the
adjusted R-squared is 0.3074. The coefficient
of the interaction between information
asymmetry with equity-based compensa-
tion is negative, but significant. Instead of
strengthening the relationship of equity-
based compensation and the CDS spread,
information asymmetry will weaken the
relationship. The reason is that the hidden
information known by the executives has
already been used, and reflected in their
risk-taking decision which is captured in
Model 1. Thus, the information asymme-
try does not add incentives for the risk-tak-
ing behavior of the executives.
The interaction between information
asymmetry with debt-like compensation
has a negative coefficient and a significance
below 1 percent. This means that informa-
Table 4. Regression Result of Model 2
Description:
EBC= Equity-based Compensation; DLC= Debt-like Compensation; IA= Information Asymmetry; IA*EBC=
Interaction between information asymmetry and equity-based compensation; IA* DLC= Interaction between
information asymmetry and debt like compensation; LEV= Leverage; OWN= Ownership Structure; CHR=
Cash Holding Ratio; FR= Firm Risk; ROA= Return of Asset; TQ= Tobin’s Q.
 Variable Expectation 
CDS 
Coeff Prob 
C   0.0044676 0.130 
EBC + 0.000033 0.000 
DLC - 0.0020352 0.000 
IA + -0.0028255 0.057 
IA*EBC + -0.0103837 0.000 
IA*DLC - -0.0125916 0.000 
LEV + 0.0143249 0.000 
OWN + 0.0002625 0.000 
CHR - -0.0048796 0.180 
FR + 0.039787 0.000 
ROA - -0.0001274 0.011 
TQ - -0.001282 0.187 
Adj. R-squared 0.3074 
F-statistic 11,674.58 




tion asymmetry weakens the relationships
of debt-like based compensation and the
CDS spread. This result supports the pre-
vious study of Vallascas and Keasey (2013)
and Wintoki et al. (2012). They find that
the default risk of a firm is increased due to
information asymmetry and, based on stud-
ies by Bolton et. al. (2015), Wei and
Yermack (2011), and Edmans and Liu
(2010), debt-like compensation reduces
risk-taking by the executives. Since they
have different directions, information asym-
metry increases the risk while debt-like
compensation reduces the risk, the infor-
mation asymmetry will neutralize the rela-
tionship of debt-like compensation and the
CDS spread.
CFO on CDS Spread
The model has the F-statistic of 60.00
with a probability (F-statistic) of 0.000
which is much smaller than 1 percent. This
suggests that the independent variables sig-
nificantly affect the dependent variable si-
multaneously. The adjusted R-squared is
0.3331 or 33 percent. It shows that the CDS
spread can be explained by CFO OBC,
CFO DBC, OEB OBC, OEB DBC, infor-
mation asymmetry, leverage, ownership,
Table 5. Regression Result of Model 3




Coeff. Prob.   
C  0.0195844 0.120   
CFO EBC + 0.0009122 0.105  
CFO’s Equity-based 
Compensation 
CFO DLC - 0.0019625 0.020  ** CFO’s Debt-like Compensation 
OBE EBC + -0.0001018 0.000 *** 
Other board executives’ Equity-
based Compensation 
OBE DLC - -0.0019013 0.000 *** 
Other board executives’ Debt-like 
Compensation 
IA + -0.0056141 0.000 *** Information Asymmetry 
LEV + 0.0122068 0.001 ** Leverage 
OWN + 0.0002389 0.000 *** Ownership Structure 
CHR - -0.0142514 0.010 ** Cash Holding Ratio 
FR + 0.0373153 0.000 *** Firm Risk 
ROA - -0.0000845 0.010 ** Return of Asset 
TQ - -0.0000982 0.466   Tobin’s Q 
Adj. R-squared 0.3331   
F-statistic 60.00  
Prob. (F-statistic) 0   
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cash holding ratio, firm risk, ROA, and
Tobin’s Q by 33 percent, and the remain-
ing 67 percent is explained by other vari-
ables that are not addressed in this study.
This paper also compares the effect
of the CFOs’ and other executives’ com-
pensation on the CDS spread. The CFOs’
equity-based compensation has a positive
coefficient but does not significantly affect
the CDS spread, while the other board ex-
ecutives’ equity-based compensation signifi-
cantly affects the CDS spread. This is prob-
ably due to the CFO receiving less equity-
based compensation compared to the other
board executives. While, on average, the
CFO received USD 7,780 million equity-
based compensation, other board execu-
tives, on average, received USD 15,152
million equity-based compensation each.
However, when the CFO is excluded from
the executives’ equity-based compensation,
this type of compensation has a negative
impact on the CDS spread. It can be seen
from the negative coefficient of the other
board executives’ equity-based compensa-
tion which is -0.0001018. While the CFO’s
equity-based compensation has no effect
on CDS spread, the equity-based compen-
sation could reduce the risk-taking behav-
ior by the other board executives. Duong
and Evans (2015) find that a CFO’s com-
pensation is not related to his/her perfor-
mance. When the CFO delivers lower qual-
ity reporting, they receive a higher non-
cash compensation. It supports the finding
of this paper. The CFO will not be trig-
gered to take more risk since his/her com-
pensation is not related to performance.
Both a CFO’s debt-like compensation
and the other board executives’ debt-like
compensation significantly affect the CDS
spread and this is comparable at a level of
significance of 5 percent. The coefficients
of debt-like compensation for the CFO and
other board executives are 0.0019625 and -
0.0019013, respectively. The coefficient for
the CFO is slightly higher than for the
other board executives. It means the CFO’s
debt-like compensation has a bigger impact
on the CDS spread, compared to that of
the other board executives. Hence, Hy-
pothesis 3b is not rejected. However, the
CFO’s debt-like compensation has a posi-
tive coefficient which aligns with the regres-
sion result in Model 1, while the coefficient
of the other board executives’ debt-like
compensation is negative, which supports
the previous studies by Bolton et al. (2015),
Wei and Yermack (2011), and Edmans and
Liu (2010).
Control Variable Analysis
All the control variables in this paper
affect the CDS spread, and meet the expec-
tations, except the Tobin’s Q and cash
holding ratio. Except for the Tobin’s Q and
cash holding ratio, the results align with
studies by Coles et al. (2006). A study by
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) reveals that mar-
ket capitalization has a significantly nega-
tive relationship with the CDS spread, but
only for highly rated companies because
in this case, the debt holder has greater trust
that the company will be able to pay its
obligation. This research uses Tobin’s Q,
which is the percentage of market capitali-
zation on total assets. This research does
not categorize the company based on their
bond rating. Since the sample might con-
sist of highly rated and low rated compa-
nies, the effect of ratio of Tobin’s Q on
the CDS spread does not seem to matter.
In all of the models, the cash holding ratio
has a negative coefficient, supporting the
simple intuition that higher cash reserves
make corporate debt safer. However, the
Meizaroh and Masripah
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cash holding ratio does not significantly
affect the CDS spread in Model 1 and
Model 2, but it significantly affects the CDS
spread in Model 3. A possible explanation
could be because of endogenous adjust-
ments in the cash holdings of the firms,
which will be used for investments instead
of keeping it as free cash (Léautier 2007).
Conclusions
This study aims to give a better un-
derstanding of the effect of executive com-
pensation on the CDS spread, as a proxy
of the credit risk of the company. The re-
lationship between compensation and risk
remains a challenge, since a lot of financial
scandals started with a demand for higher
compensation. This study focuses on the
explanatory variable executive compensa-
tion and the dependent variable CDS
spread. Both forms of equity-based com-
pensation and debt-like compensation will
induce risk-taking behavior by the execu-
tives, reflected in a higher CDS spread.
However, debt-like compensation, as the
driver of risk-taking, has more impact com-
pared to equity-based compensation. In the
high information asymmetry environment,
the relationship between both forms of
compensation and CDS spread will be
weakened. Assuming that the executives
will use all of the information that they
have about the firm, information asymme-
try will not give an additional chance for
the executive to take more risks.
This study also looks further, into
whether the CFO has more influence on
the risk taken by the firm compared to the
other board executives. First, these findings
reveal that the CFO’s compensation has
slightly more influence on the CDS spread,
compared to the other board executives,
but this condition only occurs when the
compensation is awarded in debt-like com-
pensation form. Another finding reveals
that the CFO is more willing to take risks,
compared to other board executives, espe-
cially when the compensation is given in
the form of debt-like compensation. When
the CFO’s compensation is excluded from
the executives’ compensation, the compen-
sation has a negative relationship with risk,
which is measured by the CDS spread.
However, this study has several limitations.
Firstly, this study uses the longest time se-
ries, based on the available data, but the
sample is only from one country. A future
study may consider expanding the sample
into several countries. Hence, it can im-
prove the generalization of the results. Sec-
ondly, the CDS spread data has a tendency
for dispersion. Before the outlier treatment
performed in this study, the distribution of
the CDS spread has a heavy right tail and
strong skewness. Further research should
attempt to use another form of regression,
such as quantile regressions, to give a bet-
ter description of the entire conditional dis-
tribution of the CDS spread.
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